Colloquium Series

Wednesday Faculty Colloquium

Brosig-Koch, Burgard, Chwolka, Eichfelder, Gischer, Gropp, Jeworrek, R. Kirstein, Knabe, Koetter, Kvasnicka, Lukas, St. Müller, S. Müller, Noth, Paqué, Raith, Reichling, Sadrieh, Schlägel, Schmidt, Schosser, Schöndube-Pirchegger, Spengler, Ulmer, Vogt, Weimann,
Heinrich, Held, A. Kirstein, Kleber, Li, Ludolph, Neubert

Prof. Dr. Michael Kvasnicka / +49 391-67-58739

Prof. Dr. Marlin Ulmer / +49 391-67-58225

Gina Gierk
+49 391 67-58740

Time and Room
Time: Wednesdays, 3 pm s.t. - 5 pm
Location: Campus, building 22, room A-225 (Fakultätszentrum)
(exceptions will be noted below)

Date Speaker/Author Title
We. 13/04/22
3:00 pm
We. 20/04/22
3:00 pm

Prof. Dr. Robin Christmann, Leibniz-Fachhochschule
Inviting person:
Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein
Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player Game

This paper contributes to the question whether plea bargaining is compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. We stylize inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two impartial investigators, judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt. Our analysis shows that the introduction of plea deals in courtroom helps to overcome the problem of effort coordination between the two investigating agents. Moreover, we demonstrate that plea bargaining reduces the number of wrongful convictions in the inquisitorial setup with two investigators, but this comes at the cost of some guilty defendants getting away unpunished. Our results substantiate the previous presumption in the literature that adversarial systems show a stronger aversion to wrongful convictions, and we find this preference transferred to inquisitorial criminal procedure through the introduction of plea bargaining.

We. 11/05/22
3:00 pm

Dr. Maja Adena, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
Inviting person:
Jun.-Prof. Dr. Sabrina Jeworrek
Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? A nation-wide field experiment on Facebook (with Anselm Hager)

Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? Using the Facebook advertising tool, we implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning almost 8,000 postal codes to Save the Children fundraising videos or to a pure control. We studied changes in the volume and frequency of donations to Save the Children and other charities by postal code. Our design circumvents many difficulties inherent in studies based on click-through data, especially substitution and measurement issues. We found that (i) video fundraising increased donation frequency and value to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found non-negligible crowding out of donations to other similar charities or projects. Finally, we demonstrated that click data are an inappropriate proxy for donations and recommend that managers use careful experimental designs that can plausibly evaluate the effects of advertising on relevant outcomes.

We. 18/05/22
3:00 pm
We. 08/06/22
3:00 pm

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Sandra Kronenberger, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz,
Office Hour: 11:30am; Room: G22D-202
Inviting person:
Jun.-Prof. Dr. Max-Frederik Neubert
Trade-offs in the Design of Fair Value Standards

This paper analyzes the information qualities of the current fair value standard in US-GAAP and IFRS in terms of managerial bias and value relevance. The current standard favors reliable market-based inputs over sometimes more relevant entity-specific inputs as it requires preparers to use the measurement approach, which maximizes observable inputs and minimizes unobservable inputs. We apply a model of rational expectations in line with Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and introduce, in addition to the manager and the investors, an auditor as well as an information structure including public and private signals. In contrast to common intuition, we find that maximizing observable inputs does not necessarily lead to a lower managerial bias. In fact, an alternative standard, which requires the maximization of unobservable inputs, can simultaneously provide a lower managerial bias and a higher value relevance than the current standard, depending on the information environment. This is the case, for example, when the auditor''''''''s liability is low. The results are important for regulators and scholars since they show that the trade-offs for standard setters are not as clear-cut as commonly suggested.

We. 15/06/22
3:00 pm
We. 06/07/22
3:00 pm

Dr. Jacob Justus Leidner, CFA, Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Inviting person:
Prof. Dr. Anne Chwolka
Firm Opacity and Retail Investments in Attention Stocks and Lottery Stocks: Evidence from Robinhood Investors

This study investigates whether firm opacity impacts the investment behaviors and outcomes of retail investors using the fintech brokerage Robinhood (i.e., “RH investors”). We theorize that higher firm opacity leads RH investors to make nonrational investment decisions. The testable prediction is that firm opacity increases RH investors’ investments in attention stocks and lottery stocks, which are two prominent nonrational behaviors of retail investors. Empirical findings using a measure of RH investors’ stock holdings support this prediction. Furthermore, firm opacity amplifies RH investors’ negative returns from investing in attention stocks and lottery stocks. Additional analyses show that the effect of firm opacity on RH investors’ stock holdings persists during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that opacity affects RH investors’ stock trading. These findings suggest that reducing firm opacity could help to lessen the nonrational investments, as well as the associated adverse consequences, of retail investors trading on Robinhood-type platforms.

Idee und Umsetzung: Prof. Dr. Abdolkarim Sadrieh und Dipl.-Kfm. Harald Wypior | © 2022

Letzte Änderung: 24.07.2019 - Ansprechpartner: Webmaster